2023-05-09 23:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
//===---- KCFI.cpp - Implements Kernel Control-Flow Integrity (KCFI) ------===//
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
|
|
|
|
// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
|
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
|
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|
|
//
|
|
|
|
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
|
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//
|
2023-05-09 23:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
// This pass implements Kernel Control-Flow Integrity (KCFI) indirect call
|
|
|
|
// check lowering. For each call instruction with a cfi-type attribute, it
|
|
|
|
// emits an arch-specific check before the call, and bundles the check and
|
|
|
|
// the call to prevent unintentional modifications.
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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|
#include "llvm/ADT/Statistic.h"
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineFunctionPass.h"
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|
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineInstrBuilder.h"
|
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineInstrBundle.h"
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineModuleInfo.h"
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/TargetInstrInfo.h"
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/TargetLowering.h"
|
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#include "llvm/CodeGen/TargetSubtargetInfo.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "llvm/InitializePasses.h"
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
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|
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|
|
using namespace llvm;
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2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
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#define DEBUG_TYPE "kcfi"
|
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|
|
#define KCFI_PASS_NAME "Insert KCFI indirect call checks"
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
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|
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|
|
STATISTIC(NumKCFIChecksAdded, "Number of indirect call checks added");
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
namespace {
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
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|
class KCFI : public MachineFunctionPass {
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
public:
|
|
|
|
static char ID;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
KCFI() : MachineFunctionPass(ID) {}
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
StringRef getPassName() const override { return KCFI_PASS_NAME; }
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
bool runOnMachineFunction(MachineFunction &MF) override;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
|
|
/// Machine instruction info used throughout the class.
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
const TargetInstrInfo *TII = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// Target lowering for arch-specific parts.
|
|
|
|
const TargetLowering *TLI = nullptr;
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// Emits a KCFI check before an indirect call.
|
|
|
|
/// \returns true if the check was added and false otherwise.
|
|
|
|
bool emitCheck(MachineBasicBlock &MBB,
|
|
|
|
MachineBasicBlock::instr_iterator I) const;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
char KCFI::ID = 0;
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
} // end anonymous namespace
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
INITIALIZE_PASS(KCFI, DEBUG_TYPE, KCFI_PASS_NAME, false, false)
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
FunctionPass *llvm::createKCFIPass() { return new KCFI(); }
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
bool KCFI::emitCheck(MachineBasicBlock &MBB,
|
|
|
|
MachineBasicBlock::instr_iterator MBBI) const {
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
assert(TII && "Target instruction info was not initialized");
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(TLI && "Target lowering was not initialized");
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If the call instruction is bundled, we can only emit a check safely if
|
|
|
|
// it's the first instruction in the bundle.
|
|
|
|
if (MBBI->isBundled() && !std::prev(MBBI)->isBundle())
|
|
|
|
report_fatal_error("Cannot emit a KCFI check for a bundled call");
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Emit a KCFI check for the call instruction at MBBI. The implementation
|
|
|
|
// must unfold memory operands if applicable.
|
|
|
|
MachineInstr *Check = TLI->EmitKCFICheck(MBB, MBBI, TII);
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Clear the original call's CFI type.
|
|
|
|
assert(MBBI->isCall() && "Unexpected instruction type");
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
MBBI->setCFIType(*MBB.getParent(), 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If not already bundled, bundle the check and the call to prevent
|
|
|
|
// further changes.
|
|
|
|
if (!MBBI->isBundled())
|
|
|
|
finalizeBundle(MBB, Check->getIterator(), std::next(MBBI->getIterator()));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
++NumKCFIChecksAdded;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
bool KCFI::runOnMachineFunction(MachineFunction &MF) {
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
const Module *M = MF.getMMI().getModule();
|
|
|
|
if (!M->getModuleFlag("kcfi"))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
const auto &SubTarget = MF.getSubtarget();
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
TII = SubTarget.getInstrInfo();
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
TLI = SubTarget.getTargetLowering();
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool Changed = false;
|
|
|
|
for (MachineBasicBlock &MBB : MF) {
|
2023-05-09 16:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Use instr_iterator because we don't want to skip bundles.
|
KCFI sanitizer
The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
2022-02-15 14:32:08 -08:00
|
|
|
for (MachineBasicBlock::instr_iterator MII = MBB.instr_begin(),
|
|
|
|
MIE = MBB.instr_end();
|
|
|
|
MII != MIE; ++MII) {
|
|
|
|
if (MII->isCall() && MII->getCFIType())
|
|
|
|
Changed |= emitCheck(MBB, MII);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return Changed;
|
|
|
|
}
|